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Legal Ethics, Volume 9, No. 2
Building a Better Lawyer Discipline System:
The Queensland Experience
LESLIE C. LEVIN-
I. Introduction
Over the last 35 years, it has become increasingly apparent that there is something seriously
wrong with lawyer discipline systems. ' Traditionally discipline was administered by lawyers'
professional associations, which were slow in responding to complaints, overly lenient, and
notoriously unresponsive to consumer concerns. Significant reform has not come quickly,2
but in many common law jurisdictions after some experiments and false starts meaning-
ful reforms are taking hold. The magnitude of the reforms is well illustrated in Queensland,
where the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) ("the Act") substantially altered the structure and
focus of lawyer discipline in that jurisdiction.
Before 2004, the Queensland Law Society and the Bar Association handled most discipline
complaints against solicitors and barristers. Their efforts focused primarily on serious mis-
conduct and rarely addressed the more common client complaints like failure to communi-
cate or neglect of client matters. In 2004, the Act shifted the responsibility for lawyer
discipline to an independent Legal Services Commissioner, who was effectively directed by
the legislation to take a much more consumer-oriented approach to lawyer discipline.
Queensland was not the first Australian state to move the administration of lawyer disci-
pline out of professional associations and into an independent agency . Nor was it the first
* Professor of Law, Unix ersity of Connecticut School of Law. I would like to thank the Centre for Public,
Intcrnational and Comparativc Law, T.C. Bcirnc School of Law, University of Quccnsland tor rcscarch support
during m) fellowship. I am also deeply grateful to Drs Linda Hailer, Reid Mortensen and Christine Parker for pro
viding mc with invaluable comments on an carlicr draft of this articlc. Finally, I would likc to thank the individuals
who agreed to speak with me, and who generously provided me with their time and insights, in an effort to help me
bcttcr undcrstand the lawyer disciplinc rcforms in Quccnsland.
1 For example, the American Bar Association described the state ofUS lawyer discipline as "scandalous": Special
Committcc on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforccmcnt, Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary En/brcemeni
(ABA, 1970). See also the discussions of law er discipline in L.J. Powell, "Professional Divestiture: The Cession
of Rcsponsibility tor Lawyer Discipline" (1986) 11 Law & Social Inquiry 31; 1 I.W. Arthurs, "The Dead Parrot:
Does Professional Self Regulation Exhibit Vital Signs?" (1995) 33 Alberta Law Review 800; AI. Davies, "The
Regulatory Crisis in the Solicitors' Profession" (2003) 6 Legal Ethics 185.
2 Sir Dav id Clementi's relatixely recent report on law) er regulation in England and Wales rev eals the intractabil
ity of some of the problcms: D. Clcmcnti, Reviem of ihe Regulaior, Framework of Legal Services in England and Wales:
Final Report, December 2004.
' Western Australia adopted rcforms in the 1 980s which removed the discipline tunction from professional asso-
ciations and put it in the hands of an independent Legal Practice Board, Complaints Committee and Disciplinary
Tribunal. See E. Shinnick, F. Bruinsma and C. Parker, "Aspects of Regulatory Reform in the Legal Profession:
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state to establish a discipline agency with a consumer protection focus. The earlier discipline
reforms have been critiqued, however, on the ground that they essentially "patched on" con-
sumer protection functions to traditional self-regulatory processes. 4 Moreover, the reforms
in other states were often deficient in the remedies available to legal consumers.' The Legal
Profession Act 2004 (Qld) borrows from other states' approaches. 6 One obvious question is
whether Queensland learned from earlier mistakes-or did it repeat them?
In late 2006, a little more than two years after the effective date of the Act, I talked to many
of the professionals and lay people who participate directly in the regulation of lawyers in
Queensland. 7 I attempted through these conversations to learn more about Queensland's
lawyer discipline reforms, in the hope that I could gain a fresh perspective on how best to
address some of the problems that continue to plague other jurisdictions as they struggle to
improve their lawyer discipline systems. I found that the players in the Queensland process
were working well together within the new discipline structure which is a radical departure
from the pre-existing system to determine the best ways in which to implement the goals
of the Act.
While lawyer regulation in Queensland is still in transition, it is not too soon to make some
preliminary observations about the reforms. On the whole, the new regulatory system
appears well conceived and is superior to the previous mechanisms for handling complaints
against barristers and solicitors. There is much that other jurisdictions can learn from
Queensland's reforms. At the same time, there are still some ways in which Queensland's
lawyer discipline system can be improved. And so while recognising that the lawyer disci-
pline reforms in Queensland can still be termed "a work in progress", this article will
describe some of the significant changes that have occurred to date, raise some questions
about the structure and operation of the current system, and make some suggestions for the
future.
II. A Brief History of Lawyer Discipline in Queensland
The Australian courts have consistently maintained their inherent authority to impose disci-
pline on lawyers.' Nevertheless, professional associations of solicitors and barristers histori-
cally were given or assumed most of the responsibility for disciplining Australian lawyers
until the end of the 20th century. 9
Australia, Ircland and thcNcthcrlands" (2003) 10lniernaiionalJournal ofthe Legal Pro/ission 237, 245. Ncw South
Wales created an independent law) er discipline agency in 1993: Legal Profession Reform Act 1993 (NSXX).
4 C. Parker, "Regulation of the Ethics of Australian Legal Practice: Autonomy and Responsi eness" (2002) 25
Universit, of New South Wales Law Journal 676, 690.
Ibid, 691.
6 Quccnsland's rcorms borrow hcavily from the cgal Profession Act 1987 (NSW): R. \lortcnscn and L. IIallcr,
"Legal Profession Reform in Queensland" (2004) 23 Unize;sity of Queensland Law Jountl 280, 282. It also incor
poratcs certain provisions of thc national Alodel Laws: National Legal Profession Modcl Bill (2004).
7 I interviewed 17 justices, solicitors, barristers, lay people, and regulators, including some individuals directly
affiliated with the Queensland Iaw Society and the Queensland Bar Association. In most cases, the interviews were
conducted with the promise of confidentiality and accordingly, references in this article to particular interv iews do
not include the names of the individuals with whom I spoke.
G.L. Dal Pont, Lauwyers "PrfessionalResponsibiity (Melbourne, Thomson, 3rd edn, 2006), 512.
9 Scc D. Wcisbrot, Australian Lawyers (Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1990), 193, 199-201.
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In Queensland, the Law Society Act 1927 (Qld) established the Queensland Law Society
as an incorporated body, created a tribunal of the Law Society ("the Statutory Committee")
to hear complaints against solicitors, and gave it the power to strike them off the roll." The
court retained ultimate jurisdiction over solicitor discipline, however, and the Statutory
Committee's decisions could be appealed to the courts. During the 1920s, the Law Society
was also given the authority to monitor solicitors' trust accounts and in 1930 it received the
power to decline to issue solicitors' practising certificates.''
In contrast, the Queensland Bar Association, which was formed in 1903, was a voluntary
association of barristers and it had no statutory authority to impose discipline. 12 It was, in
essence, a "toothless tiger".13 When it received what appeared to be a possibly meritorious
complaint about a member, the Bar Committee (the Association's Board of Directors) would
refer the matter to an ad hoc committee that would investigate and make a recommendation.
Other than encouraging barristers to voluntarily undertake to make certain changes, or
removing a barrister from membership of the Bar Association, it had no direct power over its
members. In very rare cases, it would go to the court and ask that the court use its inherent
power to strike a barrister off the roll. 14
Starting in the 1970s, serious questions began to be raised about the effectiveness of lawyer
self-regulation throughout Australia. In New South Wales, where the most rigorous and
extensive study of lawyer discipline was conducted, the Law Reform Commission concluded
that "a significant number of complaints against lawyers are not dealt with fairly and effec-
tively". 1  The Commission also noted that problems arising out of matters that concerned
the ordinary consumer, including overbilling, neglect of client matters and lack of compe-
tence, were not being handled as disciplinary matters. 16 In subsequent years, growing con-
cerns about the efficacy of lawyer self-regulation led to recommendations in several
Australian jurisdictions that lay persons participate in the discipline hearing panels and that
ombudsmen review the discipline process run by lawyers.
In 1985, Queensland's Parliament enacted legislation establishing a Lay Observer and cre-
ating the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. 17 The Tribunal was a lower level tribunal which
would hear matters in panels of two solicitors and one lay person. Unlike the Statutory
Committee, which was composed exclusively of solicitors, the Solicitors Disciplinary
Tribunal could not strike off or suspend a solicitor.' In 1997, the Statutory Committee and
the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal were replaced by the single Solicitors Complaints
Tribunal, which heard discipline matters in panels composed of two solicitors and one lay
L I.aw Society Act 1927 (Qld), ss 3, 5.
1 Trust Accounts Act 1923 (Qld); L. Hailer, "'Waiting in the Wings': The Suspension of Queensland Lawyers"
(2003) 3 Queensland tUniversi, ofTechnology, Law andyusliceJourna 397, 416-17.
12 L. Hailer, I)sc ipline ofthe Queensland Legal Profession (2006) (unpublished dissertation on file with author),
123-4.
13 Inter iew # 2 with Queensland Supreme Court Justice (Brisbane, 5 October 2006).
Ilallcr, supra n. 12, 124-6,131.
1' New South Wales Reform Commission, Legal Profession Discussion Paper No 2, Comnplaints, Discipline and
Pro>ssional Slandards, Part 1 (1979), 7.
16 Ibid, 7 9.
17 Quccnsland Law Socicty Act Amcndmcnt Act 1985 (Qld).
18 L. Haller, "Solicitors' Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930 2000: A Statistical Analysis" (2001) 13 Bond
Law Review 1, 4.
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person. A Legal Ombudsman was also appointed, with the power to bring charges against
solicitors and to appeal decisions of the Solicitors Complaints Tribunal. 19
By this time, the Australian state Attorneys-General recognised the need for more serious
structural changes in lawyer regulation and some jurisdictions began to move lawyer disci-
pline out of the control of the professional associations. 21 1 Efforts to implement significant
structural changes in lawyer discipline were accelerated during the late 1990s due to scandals
involving lawyers or inadequate lawyer discipline. 21 Queensland endured its own serious
scandal in the late 1990s when it was discovered that Gold Coast solicitor Harry Smith had
misappropriated more than $ 6 million from his elderly clients, and managed to single-
handedly deplete the Queensland Legal Practitioners Fidelity Guarantee Fund.22
By 2001, the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General adopted a resolution to develop
national model laws ("Model Laws") that would help to promote uniformity in the regulation
of lawyers. 23 While work was underway on the Model Laws, a new scandal broke out in
Queensland in 2002 involving Brisbane's Baker Johnson law firm. This issue dominated the
headlines of the Brisbane Courier-Mail, which published more than 17 stories reporting egre-
gious overcharging by the firm and the Law Society's failure to act on more than 100 com-
plaints against the firm.24 As a result of the scandal, Queensland's Attorney-General and its
Minister ofJustice asked the Legal Ombudsman to investigate the Queensland Law Society's
handling of the Baker Johnson matter, as well as its general complaints handling procedures.
The Legal Ombudsman issued a damning report of the Law Society's complaints handling
procedures, and recommended that an independent body handle complaints because of the
Law Society's "conflict of interest in maintaining a regulatory role as well as maintaining
their [sic] role as a Society to benefit the profession". 2
By mid-2003, the Law Society reluctantly recognised that it must give up much of its
involvement in lawyer discipline. 26 The Bar Association seemingly welcomed changes that
would create more power to discipline barristers. 27 The judiciary did not oppose the estab-
lishment of an independent lawyer discipline agency that was overseen by the Government. 2
"9 Queensland l.aw Society Amendment Act 1997 (Qjd); Queensland I.aw Society Act 1952 (Qld), s 6AI(1),
inserted by Queensland Law Society Legislation Amendment Act 1997 (Qld), s 9.
20 By the late 19 90s, Western Australia and New South Wales had already implemented some changes (scc supra
n. 3), although the professional associations continued to investigate complaints against lawyers. B) 1996, Victoria
permitted persons to make complaints to the Legal Ombudsman or the protessional associations and the
Ombudsman could conduct an inxestigation: Legal Profession Act 1996 (Vic), ss 138, 143.
21 Scc cg R. Bond, "ASIC Must Get Tough on '\anagers", The Ausqralian (Sydney), 6 January 1999, 26;
D. Carrigg, "Fund Woes Hang ONer Lawyers", HobartMercury (Hobart), 1 May 1999; R. Campbell, "Disciplinary
Plan for Lawyers; Will Incident Prompts MLA's \love", Canberra Timnes (Canberra), 30 August 1997, A6; IIallcr,
supra n. 12, 158 n. 180.
22 A. Evans, "Queensland Fidelity Compensation 1990-2004: The End of thc Loncy Tree" (2004) 23 tUniversil),
of'Queensland Law Journal 397, 402; P. Whittaker and R. Callinan, "Claims Against Lawyers Outstrip Funds",
Courier Mail (Brisbane), 20 February 1999, 4.
23 Dal Pont, supra n. 8, 16.
24 Sccl allcr, swpra n. 12, 158-9. The story also received extended national coverage: sac S. Balough, "We Win
and You Pay", The W/eekenddustralian (Sydney), 17 August 2002, 24.
2 I.egal Ombudsman, The Queensland Law Sociely and Baker ]ohnson Law),ers (2003), 2, 5, 7-8.
26 See C. Griffith, "No Longer a Law Unto Themselxes", (Jourier Mail (Brisbane), 10 Ala) 2003, 34.
2 I Iallcr, swpra n. 12,131-2, 136.
28 In 1999, Queensland's Attorney General had circulated a Green Paper on reform that would place lawyer reg
ulation in the hands of an independent agency which would be supervised by the judiciary: Queensland Green
Paper, Legal Pro/ession Refim (1999). The judiciary opposed that proposal. It did not want to oversee such an
agency due to concern that it would expose the court to "undue criticism and controversy", that it would distract
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Apparently contemplating an upcoming state election, and feeling unable to wait for the
release of the Model Laws, Queensland's Parliament passed the Legal Profession Act 2003
(Qld), which was based in part on a consultation draft of the Model Laws, and provided, inter
alia, for the establishment of an independent lawyer discipline agency.29 After the Model
Laws were released, but before the Legal Profession Act 2003 (Qld) commenced, the Legal
Profession Act 2004 (Qld) was passed, which restated much of the 2003 Act and added some
additional provisions concerning, inter alia, multidisciplinary partnerships, the fidelity fund
and the practice of foreign law. 30
III. The Content and Implementation of
the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld)
A. The Legal Profession Act 2004
The Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) significantly altered the structure of lawyer discipline
in Queensland and broadened its focus. The Act provides for the appointment by the
Attorney-General of a Legal Services Commissioner ("the LSC"), who may be a lay person
or a lawyer.31 The Act gives the LSC the exclusive power to receive complaints and, where
appropriate, to dismiss them without investigation. 32 The LSC may refer those complaints
to the Law Society or the Bar Association for investigation and recommendations, but he
reviews the recommendations and has the ultimate authority to determine whether a matter
should be prosecuted. 33 If the LSC decides to proceed with a matter, he has the exclusive
authority to prosecute the case. 3
4
Under the Act, complaints that are not immediately dismissed are divided into three cat-
egories. Complaints of "professional misconduct" allege conduct that would "justify a find-
ing that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice" and includes
"a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence
or diligence". 3- Complaints of "unsatisfactory professional conduct" allege conduct that
"falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is enti-
tled to expect of a reasonably competent Australian practitioner". 36 "Professional miscon-
duct" and "unsatisfactory professional conduct" complaints (hereinafter "conduct matters")
are heard in separate tribunals, as described below. Complaints involving "consumer dis-
putes" are disputes between a person and a legal practitioner that "do not involve an issue of
the court from its core function, and that the court lacked the resources to adequately fund such a system. See
S. Monk and S. Ryan, "Judges Attack Oxerhaul Bid", Courier Mail (Brisbane), 20 September 1999, 9; Interview
# 5 with Queensland Supreme Court Justice (Brisbane, 12 October 2006).
29 Mortcnscn and IIallcr, supra n. 6, 280-1.
30 The Act was again amended in May 2006: Legal Profession Amendment Act 2006 (Qld) No 24.
"' Icgal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), s 414.
32 Ibid, s 2 59.
3' Ibid, ss 265(2), 273. The masculine form is used here because the current Legal Services Commissioner is a
male.
" Ibid, s 276.
3' Ibid, s 245 (1).
36 Ibid, s 244. The Act also details specific types of conduct that constitute unsatisfactory professional conduct or
professional misconduct, including, inter ahia, charging excessiv e legal costs and con iction of a serious offence: ibid,
s 259 (6)(b)-(c).
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unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct". 37 The LSC may suggest to
the parties that they enter into mediation to resolve these disputes, but mediation is volun-
tary and consumer disputes will not result in a hearing.38
The Act represents a significant departure from the prior system, not only because it
establishes an independent agency to handle complaints about lawyers, but because of its
decidedly consumer-oriented tilt. Problems with lawyer competence and diligence which
had previously been largely ignored by those in charge of lawyer discipline are now
expressly a basis for discipline. The standard applied in determining unsatisfactory profes-
sional misconduct is no longer what the community of lawyers thinks about the conduct, but
rather what a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent Australian
legal practitioner. 39 The Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) provides for a mechanism to medi-
ate minor consumer disputes, so that clients can obtain some relief. The Act also provides
that all disciplinary action taken against an Australian legal practitioner must be maintained
by the LSC on a discipline register which must be available on the LSC's website.
4 1
One significant way in which the Act differs from the Model Laws is in its use of two sep-
arate tribunals to hear discipline matters. 41 Professional misconduct complaints are heard by
the Legal Practice Tribunal, which is composed of members of the Queensland Supreme
Court, and is constituted by any one of its members. 42 The single justice, who alone consti-
tutes the Legal Practice Tribunal, sits with one member of a lay panel and one member of a
practitioner panel who are to "help" him in hearing and deciding a discipline application. 43
The Legal Practice Tribunal's decisions may be appealed to the Queensland Court of
Appeal. 44 Unsatisfactory professional misconduct complaints are heard by the Legal Practice
Committee, which is composed of two lawyers and a lay person. 4' Decisions by the Legal
Practice Committee may be appealed to the Legal Practice Tribunal, and, with leave, to the
Court of Appeal.4
6
The 400-plus page Act includes many other provisions concerning the regulation of
lawyers. Some reflect the fact that while Queensland has moved away from self-regulation by
lawyers, there remain co-regulatory aspects to the reforms. For example, the Act gives the
Law Society and the Bar Association the exclusive power to issue annual practising certifi-
cates. 47 In addition, the Act retains the Law Society's power to investigate solicitors' trust
fund accounts. 4
37 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qd), s 262.
JS bid, s 263(2).
31 Ibid, s 244. In contrast, the prior common law definition looked to the standard of professional conduct
"observed or approved of by members of the profession of good repute and competency": I.. I Ialler, "Imperfect
Practice under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld)" (2004) 23 Uniz,erity qf' Qeensland Law Journal 411, 417 18,
quoting Re R, a praclilioner o/lhe Supreme Courl [1927] SASR 58, 61.
40 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qd), s 296(1), (4).
4' The Model Laws contemplate that all disciplinary procccdings would be brought bcforc a single disciplinary
tribunal: National Legal Profession Model Bill (2004), s 4 .7.1.
42 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Old), s 429.
43 Ibid, ss 280(1), 437(3).
44 Jbid, s 292(1).
4, Ibid, s 282(1), 469(2).
46 Hbid, ss 293(1), 294(2).
47 Ibid, ss 44-45. While this is not a new development for the Law Society, it is a new power for the Bar
Association.
48 Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld), s 531; Trust Accounts Act 1973 (Qld), s 29; Legal Profession Act
2004 (Qld), s 204.
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B. The Implementation (f<the Legal Pro fession Act 2004
An early and symbolically significant change under the new Act is that Queensland's first
Legal Services Commissioner is not a lawyer. 49 Commissioner John Briton has a background
in dispute management and previously worked as the State's Anti-Discrimination
Commissioner and the State Director of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission."' He views the Act as "consumer protection legislation"., His consumer ori-
entation quickly manifested itself when he implemented a system at the Legal Services
Commission for handling clients' inquiries in which trained Complaints Officers would
attempt in appropriate cases to resolve a problem immediately by placing a call to the
lawyer. 52 He also decided that even though the Act did not require the LSC to post the names
of lawyers who were found to have engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct, the infor-
mation would appear on the Legal Services Commission's website. 53
At present, initial calls about a lawyer are received at the Legal Services Commission or at
the Queensland Law Society.94 All inquiries are logged into a computerised case manage-
ment system that was adapted from the one already being used by the Law Society,' and
both the Law Society and the Commission can access the full inquiry log concerning any
lawyer. In cases where it appears that the problem is simply one of poor communication or a
minor misunderstanding, the Commission's Complaint Officers or the Law Society's Client
Relations Centre may attempt informally to resolve the problem by placing a call to the
lawyer. 6 If it appears that the matter cannot be resolved, or if the allegations are of such a
serious nature that they may constitute a conduct matter, the caller is advised to file a com-
plaint with the Legal Services Commission. 57
At its inception in July 2004, the Legal Services Commission inherited 938 complaints.
Two years later, it had reportedly eliminated most of the complaint backlog, reducing the
'9 This is a departure from the practice in New South Wales and Victoria, where the only other Legal Services
Commissioners are both lawyers. While the previous incumbents of the superseded Legal Ombudsman role in
Queensland and Victoria were non-lawycrs, they lacked the broad investigative and prosccutorial powers of the
Legal Serv ices Commissioners.
,O ttp://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/commissioncr.htm.
J' J. Briton, unpublished lecture at University of Queensland, T.C. Beirne School of Law, 26 October 2006. See
also Quccnsland I.cgal Services Commission, AnnualRepor12005 06 (2006), 9 (noting that the Act "embeds the rcg-
ulation of the legal profession firmly within the legal protection context").
"2 See Queensland L.cgal Services Commission, ibid, 16. This approach was no doubt borrowed from the similar
practice used by the New South WXales Legal Serx ices Commission.
J" . Briton, The Legal Services Commission An Overview (2004), available at http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/
speeches/2004Ov erview.pdf.
5 Legal Services Commission, supra n. 51, 37. Although the Queensland Bar Association also receives a few
inquiries, the Bar Association does not encourage them and directs callers to the Legal Serv ices Commission if the)
wish to make a complaint. Queensland Bar Association, How to Make a Complaint, http://www, qldbar.asn.au/
2199.html.
J5 . Briton, The LegalServices Commission One Year On, 26 October 2005, 18, available at http://www.lsc.qld.
gox .au/speeches/QU'I'OctO5.pdf. Unfortunately, the Queensland Bar Association did not maintain computerised
records of thc complaints it received and the Icgal Services Commission does not have access to most complaints
lodged against barristers prior to 2004: Interview # 9 with Legal Serv ices Commission regulator (Brisbane, 17
October 2006).
16 See Queensland Law Society, http://www.qls.com.au/wse/lwp/workplace/!ut/Your+Solicitor/If+y ou+
I Iavc+Conccrns/Clicnt+Rclations+Ccntrc; Iegal Services Commission, supra n. 51, 16.
,7 The method for filing the complaint is described on the Commission's website: http://www.lsc.qld.gox.au/
complaint. htm#6.
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number of pending pre-Act complaints to 29.-8 After initially relying heavily on the inves-
tigative resources of the Law Society and the Bar Association, which handled most of the
investigations in the LSC's first year of operation, by mid-2006 only about half of the inves-
tigations were being referred to the Law Society or the Bar Association for investigation,
while the remainder were handled by the Legal Services Commission. s9
Although the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) does not expressly provide for private
discipline, some complaints are resolved privately. Complaints that allege unsatisfactory pro-
fessional conduct may be resolved informally with the Legal Services Commission if the
lawyer will take restorative steps such as apologising to the complainant, waiving some or all
of a fee, or implementing better office systems. In such cases, the Commission "will use the
leverage the Act gives [it] to seek to persuade [lawyers] to do whatever they reasonably can
to put things right, and to prevent similar mistakes in the future". 6 1 If the LSC is satisfied
with the steps taken by the lawyer, the complaints are dismissed in the "public interest",
based on the theory that there is no public interest in prosecuting them. At present, almost
15% of all conduct matters are dismissed on "public interest" grounds. 61
Due to the Legal Services Commission's ability to resolve the complaint backlog, it has
been able to devote some of its resources to its own investigations and initiatives. Specifically,
it has initiated investigations that have revealed that law firms specialising in conveyancing
were charging undisclosed mark-ups or surcharges on outlays.62 It has also issued guidelines
for practitioners on charging outlays and on advertising personal injury services. 63
Although the news about the Queensland reforms is generally very positive, there are some
deficiencies in the Act that hamper the ability of the Legal Services Commission adequately
to address consumer concerns. As previously noted, consumer disputes can only be resolved
through voluntary mediation. Compensation orders cannot be awarded to clients for con-
sumer disputes. Even in conduct matters, compensation awards are limited to $ 7,500 for
pecuniary loss. 64 Clients who have suffered a greater pecuniary loss must undertake the
expense of litigation if they seek to recover for the damage done by their lawyers.
I also encountered a few concerns about the manner in which the current system is func-
tioning. Most notably, some of the lay members on the panel that assists the justices who
serve as the Legal Practice Tribunal felt that they were not given all of the relevant materi-
als in a timely manner, that their views were not honestly solicited, and that they were pro-
viding a symbolic rather than a true advisory function. One lay participant described her
experience as follows:
"It was overwhelming. I had absolutely no background on how it would operate. Not being a
lawyer, I didn't know. There were no criteria on which to base a decision. I thought, 'how on
earth did you make a decision?"65
While the lay members said that they did not necessarily disagree with the outcomes of the
Legal Practice Tribunal, they felt inhibited in terms of raising questions and talking during
58 Legal SerN ices Commission, supra n. 51, 13.
Sbid, 16.
60 Ibid, 10, 18.
61 Ibid, 18.
62 Ibid, 20.
63 Scc http://www.sc.qld.gov.au/policics/guidclincs/pdf.
64 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), s 290 (3).
65 Intcrvicw # 15 with I.cgal Practicc Tribunal lay pancl mcmbcr (tclcphonc intcrvicw, 6 Novcmbcr 2006).
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hearings. They also perceived that the lawyers who assisted the Tribunal were somewhat
inhibited in expressing their views. 66
I did not speak to lay members of the Legal Practice Committee, which is comprised of
lawyers and lay persons, but a former member of the Solicitors Complaints Tribunal (an
immediate predecessor to the Legal Practice Committee) reported that her views were not
seriously regarded by the lawyer members in the decision-making process. This individual
felt that she was viewed by the lawyers as "an appendage" and someone "who did not have a
brain". 67 One lawyer member of the Legal Practice Committee noted that "lay observers can
be intimidated, but you shouldn't do it".68 He also observed that an impediment to lay mem-
bers taking a strong stand against a proposed resolution of a discipline matter is that they
would need to write dissents from majority decisions, which they may feel ill-equipped to do.
This observation appears to be confirmed by the fact that there have been no dissents writ-
ten by lay members of the Legal Practice Committee and only one dissent written by a lay
member of its predecessor, the Solicitors Complaints Tribunal.
On the positive side, there is evidence that both the Law Society and the Bar Association
are not only co-operating in this transition, but are using their powers to grant practising cer-
tificates in ways that should reduce complaints about lawyers. In at least one case when the
Legal Services Commission had concerns about a solicitor, the Law Society required a phys-
ical examination of the solicitor and only renewed the practising certificate with qualifica-
tions. 69 The Bar Association has reported that when it recently had concerns about the
competency of certain barristers, it only issued practising certificates after the lawyers sub-
mitted undertakings about the procedures they would implement to avoid problems in prac-
tice.70
Finally, although I heard no complaints about the cost, the new discipline system is not
inexpensive. The budget of the Legal Services Commission in 2005 6 was $ 1.83 million.
The Bar Association staffs its investigations with barrister volunteers, but the Law Society
expended an additional $ 2 million of public funds to administer the complaints handling sys-
tem during that period. When the cost of the Legal Practice Tribunal and the Legal Practice
Committee were included, the total cost of administering the complaints handling system
was more than $ 4 million. 71
IV. Future Questions and Challenges
Less than three years after the passage of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), the transition
has been made to an independent lawyer discipline agency with a consumer-oriented focus.
Problems with neglect of client matters and failure to communicate are receiving attention
66 Interview # 14 with Legal Practice Tribunal la) panel member (Brisbane, 25 October 2006).
67 Interview # 8 with lay member of Solicitors Complaints Tribunal (Brisbane, 16 October 2006). Another for-
mer la) member of the Solicitors Complaints Tribunal did not share this view and strongly believed that his input
on that tribunal was valued: Interview # 10 with lay member of Solicitors Complaints Tribunal (Brisbane, 17
October 2006). It appears that some of the differences in lay experiences may hav e been due, in part, to differences
in gender or professional status.
61 Interview # 12 with lawyer member of Legal Practice Committee (Brisbane, 23 October 2006).
69 Interview # 4 with Queensland Law Society employee (Brisbane, 11 October 2006).
70 Interview # 13 with Queensland Bar Association officer (Brisbane, 24 October 2006).
71 Icgal Services Commission, supra n. 51, 43.
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and, in many cases, are being rapidly resolved. The Legal Services Commission, the
Queensland Law Society and the Queensland Bar Association are working together to inves-
tigate complaints and have effectively eliminated the complaint backlog. It is clear that the
lawyer discipline system is more efficient and more responsive than it was before the passage
of the Act. Thus, the Act has seemingly accomplished many of its intended goals.
There are, however, some important questions that deserve further thought at this stage
in the reforms. Some relate to the challenge of balancing consumer protection functions and
traditional lawyer discipline interests. 72 For example, is Queensland's new system paying
adequate attention (or too much attention) to its consumer protection role? How should it
resolve complaints when there is a conflict between the individual consumer's interests and
protection of the public? In other words, a solution that satisfies the individual client
perhaps the return of fees is not necessarily the best solution for the general public, which
may later be harmed in the same way by the same lawyer.
Another important question is to whom should "consumer protection" be afforded when
one is talking about protection from lawyers? Clearly protection extends to current clients who
have been harmed by their lawyers. It also extends, under the rhetoric of "public protection",
to future clients who may be subjected to the same types of misconduct. Does it extend, as well,
to non-clients who are adversely affected when lawyers and their clients work together in ways
that harm others? And does consumer protection ever extend to corporate clients, who are usu-
ally better able than individuals to take care of themselves in their dealings with lawyers?
Further questions arise when considering the types of misconduct that a discipline agency
with a consumer protection orientation might pursue. Lawyers are unquestionably engaged
in a business, but they are not the same as the businesses of car salesmen or shopkeepers.
Lawyers have competing ethical duties to the courts, to their clients and to the public. They
are paid to make complex judgment calls every day. But should clients be able to pursue com-
plaints about every mistake including mistaken judgments that a lawyer makes? And if
not, which ones should be addressed? And at what cost?
There are also some more concrete questions and challenges that remain with respect to
the structure and implementation of the new discipline system. Some of the questions arise
simply because Queensland has tried some new approaches, including the appointment of a
Legal Services Commissioner who is not a lawyer. Some questions arise from the continua-
tion of pre-existing procedures, such as the involvement of the Law Society in handling
inquiries from the public. Some arise from the effort to incorporate lay views into an adjudi-
catory structure that features significant attorney and judicial involvement in lawyer disci-
pline. I will explore some of these questions and challenges below.
Is a la y legal services commissioner desirable? Queensland appears to be the first jurisdiction
in the common law world where the lawyer discipline system is run by a non-lawyer. 73 When
72 Christinc Parker has pcrsuasivcly argucd that it does not appcar possiblc for one agency to fully mcct the goals
of both consumer empowerment and lawyer discipline and that two separate regimes are required: Parker, supra n.
4, 693. Unfortunately, at ]cast in the United Statcs, where thc discipline systems arc already undcrfundcd, it is
highly unlikely that two systems that address lawyer conduct will be funded. Accordingly, I am interested in iden
tifying how a singlc-systcm modcl might come closest to accommodating the intcrcsts of consumcr protection and
traditional law er discipline.
7 England, Walcs and Australia have had I.cgal Ombudsmen who wcrc non-lawycrs, but thcir role typically was
one of ox ersight and the) did not hax e the exclusi e power to make prosecutorial decisions or prosecute discipline
complaints. Scc also supra n. 49.
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considering the history of lawyer regulation, this is a seismic change. Lawyers have long
maintained that they need to regulate their own conduct in order to preserve their indepen-
dence from the state.7 4 They have also argued for involvement in the discipline process on
the theory that only lawyers can understand the pressures and competing obligations that are
placed on them in practice.7' These arguments continue to have traction, although by the late
20th century, experiments began with lay oversight to address concerns that external super-
vision of lawyer discipline was needed. 76
More recently, with the emergence of independent Legal Services Commissions in
Australia, there has been consideration of whether the Legal Services Commissioner must be
a lawyer. The drafters of the national Model Laws did not address the question. 77 The Legal
Profession Act 2004 (Qld) makes possible the appointment of a lay Legal Services
Commissioner, providing that the Commissioner must be "familiar with the nature of the
legal system and legal practice" but may be "a person who is not an Australian lawyer". 7
John Briton is Australia's first non-lawyer Legal Services Commissioner and some see the
fact that he is a non-lawyer as an important symbolic step. Virtually everyone I spoke to noted
the importance that the public no longer view the lawyer discipline process as a case of
"Caesar judging Caesar", and the initial appointment of a lay Commissioner helps to allay
that concern. As a practical matter, however, most of them felt that the most important ques-
tion was whether the Commissioner was the "right" person for the job, regardless of whether
that individual was a lay person or a lawyer. Among the people I spoke to, it was lawyers
and not the non-lawyers who were more likely to believe that it was important in the short
term for the Commissioner to continue to be a non-lawyer. As one lay person explained, "the
public has little interest in this or knowledge about it ... The public is not overly concerned
with who [the Legal Services Commissioner] is". 79
One interesting lesson to be learnt from Queensland's reforms is that having a non-lawyer
serve as the Legal Services Commissioner appears not to lead to adverse consequences.
Moreover, apart from the possible symbolic advantage to having a non-lawyer serve as Legal
Services Commissioner during a time when there might be lingering public suspicion of
the lawyer discipline system, there are potentially two practical advantages as well.
In Queensland, where there are fewer than 7,000 practising lawyers,80 it is likely that a
7 M.1 I. Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversar) System (Indianapolis, Bobbs-\crrill, 1975) 9-24; R.W.
Gordon, "The Independence of Lawyers" (1988) 68 Boton ULnitelity Law Review 1, 2 10; D.B. Wilkins, "Who
Should Regulate Iawycrs?" (1992) 105 Harvard Law Reiew 801, 812-13.
7' See eg Weisbrot, supra n. 9, 195; T. Ross, "Knowing No Other Duty: Prixity, The lyth of Elitism, and the
Transformation of theLcgal Profcssion" (1997) 32 Wake ForesI Law Reiew 819, 835; Wilkins, ibid, 816 n. 79.
76 The United Kingdom first started using a La) Obserxer in 1980, but he proved to be ineffective in his over
sight ofthc Law Society and the Solicitors' Complaints Bureau: see J.E. Gilbert, "Profession in Crisis?" (1989) J\ew
Law ournal, 28 April, 583. The Legal Serv ices Ombudsman for England and Wales was created b) the Courts and
Legal Services Act 1990; the Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman post was established that same year: see Law
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990, s 34. Legal Ombudsmen began to appear in Canada and
Australia shortly thereafter: see cg Law Society of British Columbia, Benchers Bulletin (December 1993); Legal
Profession Act 1993 (Tas), s 82.
7' The National Legal Profession \odcl Bill rctcrs throughout chapter 4 to the "appropriate authority", with-
out specifying who should perform that role.
7 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), s 414(2)-(3).
79 Interview # 14 with Legal Practice Tribunal la) panel member (Brisbane, 25 October 2006).
so There were 5,850 solicitors with practicing certificates on 1 July 2005: Legal Services Commission, supra n. 51,
49. There are almost 900 barristers with practising certificates in Queensland: see Queensland Bar Association,
Barrislers'Direclory, http://www.qldbar.asn.au/scction/3.html. Not all ofthcsc individuals practise in Queensland.
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lawyer-commissioner would know personally many of the Queensland lawyers about whom
complaints are made and their advocates, as well. In addition, in a legal culture where, for
barristers, Queen's Counsel and Senior Counsel attain those positions based on the judg-
ments of their peers and the judiciary, it would be exceedingly difficult for someone who has
worked within the legal community to seemingly contradict that judgment by pursuing a
complaint against someone who has achieved that rank. Moreover, the Legal Services
Commissioner may only serve for a maximum of 10 years, 1 and may need to resume law
practice thereafter. This could make the job of deciding how to handle certain complaints all
the more difficult, especially if that lawyer-commissioner someday wishes to practise law in
Queensland.
There is, in addition, another advantage to having a non-lawyer serve as the Legal Services
Commissioner. Lawyers are acculturated to the norms of the legal profession, which are
sometimes at odds with ordinary notions of morality and the interests of the public. It is
important in a lawyer discipline agency designed to protect the public that there be someone
in authority with a non-lawyer's perspective. That perspective helps to ensure that
complaints about certain lawyer misconduct will not be "overlooked" or dismissed, espe-
cially where the conduct conforms with professional norms but violates ordinary notions of
morality.
An example of the advantages of having a non-lawyer Legal Services Commissioner was
recently illustrated in Legal Services Commissioner v Mullins. 2 In that case, a discipline com-
plaint was filed against a Queensland barrister who did not reveal when settling a personal
injury automobile accident case that he had recently learned that his client was seriously ill
with cancer. The barrister continued to rely in mediation on the claim that his client had a
27 year life expectancy when he knew that this life expectancy was very unlikely due to the
client's illness. While many lawyers might take the conventional advocate's view that the bar-
rister was simply preserving privileged information and being a zealous advocate for his
client,8 3 a non-lawyer would readily see that by allowing the insurance company to settle the
case believing that his client had a 27 year life expectancy, the barrister was committing
fraud. This was, in fact, the view taken by the lay Legal Services Commissioner, who pur-
sued the complaint and obtained a reprimand and a $ 20,000 fine against a highly-regarded
member of the Bar.8 4 It is less likely that a legally-qualified commissioner or at least one
who had previously practised in Queensland would have had the courage to prosecute the
complaint.
Before leaving this topic, one other important question to consider is whether
Queensland's Legal Services Commissioner is afforded sufficient independence, regardless
of whether the LSC is a lay person or a lawyer. The answer appears to be "yes". The Legal
Services Commissioner is appointed by the Attorney-General, but may not serve for more
than 10 years. There is no requirement that the Attorney-General consult with any con-
stituency about the appointment. The LSC reports annually to the Attorney-General, who
tables the report with Parliament.8 ' The annual report is available to the public. The Legal
1 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), s 415.
s2 [2006] I.PT 012.
"3 Indeed, in the Mlins case, the barrister sought the adx ice of senior counsel, who adx ised him that he was not
required to rccal thc information during the mcdiation (ibid, 5).
'4 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), s 9.
S [bid, s 311.
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Services Commission is funded by payments from the Legal Profession Interest on Trust
Accounts Fund, and those payments are approved by the Attorney-General. 6 The LSC can
seek budget enhancements as required at any time and has done so successfully.87 Thus, the
LSC is independent from those whom he investigates and prosecutes, ie, solicitors and bar-
risters, and from their professional organisations. The LSC is also largely independent from
the judiciary, which has an institutional interest in the perception that lawyers are behaving
ethically, but may also retain ties with the bar. 8 Although the LSC is directly accountable to
the Government, some level of accountability to the public is desirable, and it is far prefer-
able that the oversight reside in those who are not being regulated by the LSC.
Is the Legal Services Commission dealing adequately with consumer protection issues? It seems
clear that the Queensland Legal Services Commission is committed to a model of individual
consumer protection, and does not view that function as subsidiary to the discipline function.
Significant resources are devoted to informally resolving consumer concerns of existing
clients. In some cases, these efforts may include obtaining agreements from lawyers to pay
clients money in order to resolve consumer dissatisfaction.8 9 Thus, while the LSC has no
power to make compensation orders, the Commission and the Law Society will sometimes
informally arrange for compensation in appropriate cases. Likewise, the Legal Services
Commission is now treating fewer complaints as "consumer disputes" and more as "unsatis-
factory professional conduct", which gives it more leverage to work out dispositions that are
likely to satisfy individual consumers.91 In other words, the Legal Services Commission is
working within the Act and at times, finding creative ways to do so to satisfy many con-
sumer concerns.
The main area in which the Legal Services Commission may not be adequately protecting
consumers is when clients are harmed by negligent legal work. Traditional consumer pro-
tection agencies protect consumers against overcharging, fraud and safety violations but
not neglect. As previously noted, however, lawyers are not typical vendors of goods and ser-
vices. They sell their advice, their advocacy and their legal drafting skills. The question
therefore arises as to whether the Legal Services Commission should attempt to address con-
sumers' complaints about mistakes that lawyers make when they perform those services.
The LSC currently does not pursue most complaints arising out of negligent legal work,
except negligence relating to the mishandling of client funds. 91 The Legal Services
Commission's website states, under "What the Commission cannot do":
"The disciplinary scheme under the Legal Profession Act 2004 is not intended to be an alterna-
tive forum to the courts for hearing and deciding claims of negligence against lawyers. The
Commission might consider taking disciplinary action against legal practitioners who have been
obviously and demonstrably negligent but, generally speaking, legal consumers who believe their
86 Ibid, ss 208-11.
87 Email from Dr L) n Aitken, Policy and Research Coordinator, Queensland Legal Ser ices Commission, to
L.cslic I.cvin, 12 March 2007.
'8 Of course, the LSC, like all litigants, cannot be completely unconcerned with the Niews of the j udiciary, since
the I.cgal Services Commission is dependent on the L.cgal Practice Tribunal for favourabic rulings.
89 Inter iew # 4 with Queensland Law Society employ ee (Brisbane, 11 October 2006).
90 I.cgal Services Commission, supra n. 51, 16.
1 This policy apparently results in the dismissal of a large number of complaints. More than 30% of the
Commission's complaints arc dismissed on the grounds that they arc not the type of mattcr that the Commission
will handle. A large number of those complaints allege negligence: Interxiew # 16 with Legal Ser ices Commission
regulator (Brisbane, 26 October 2006).
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lawyers have been negligent will have to take them to court to prove they were negligent and
should take independent legal advice accordingly. '92
While the website suggests that these matters are outside the Commission's jurisdiction, in
fact the LSC has the jurisdiction to pursue complaints that a lawyer acted negligently,
including negligent advice given by lawyers to their clients. The definition of "unsatisfactory
professional conduct" under the Act includes conduct "that falls short of the standard of
competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably
competent Australian practitioner". 93 This is a classic negligence standard. The real reasons
for not prosecuting most of these cases is that they are hard to prove and that consumers can
instead pursue their remedies in court. 94
But this approach does not bear up well under scrutiny. Sound advice and careful work go
to the heart of the services that lawyers are supposed to provide to clients, and if the work or
advice is negligent, clients can be seriously harmed. Moreover, clients often have no other
recourse because of Australia's continued recognition of advocates' immunity from suit for
the conduct of a case in court or for work "intimately connected" with a case in court.9  The
high cost of litigating negligence issues makes suit impractical in many other cases. The
Commission's failure to pursue these claims against incompetent or negligent lawyers means
that the lawyer can continue to harm the public in ways far more serious than a failure to
return phone calls, which the Commission now routinely pursues.
There is no question that negligence cases can be difficult to prove and that the cost of
Queensland's lawyer discipline system is already significant. But when decisions are being
made about which matters to pursue in the name of "consumer protection", efforts must be
made to resist pursuing the "easy" cases and routinely as a standard policy turning away
the harder ones. This is especially true when the difficult cases may have caused significantly
more damage to a client and the type of misconduct can cause substantially more future risk
to the public.
Is the Legal Services Commission over-focusing on small consumer issues? The preceding sec-
tion begins to raise the question of whether the Commission is too focused on small-scale
consumer issues. As one barrister noted, the danger with the structure of the new Legal
Services Commission is that it may become a bureaucracy. A lawyer discipline body that
views itself as a traditional consumer protection agency may tend to over-focus on small-scale
consumer issues and on measures like processing time for complaints, and could lose sight of
the bigger picture which includes all types of lawyer misconduct. Although on balance, this
does not appear to be the case with the current Legal Services Commission, 96 one example
of a decision that arguably over-focuses on the "small stuff" is the Commissioner's
Guidelines for Charging Outlays and Disbursements, with its retroactive application and its
92 http://www.lsc.qld.gox.au/about.htm#4.
9' Lcgal Profession Act 2004 (QOd), s 244.
94 Interxiew # 16 with Legal Serv ices Commission regulator (Brisbane, 26 October 2006). In addition, the Legal
Services Commission's wcbsitc says that it "might consider taking disciplinary action against legal practitioners who
hav e been obx iously and demonstrably negligent", suggesting that it will take some "easy" cases.
9' Dal Pont, supra n. 8, 126, 134-8.
96 The rhetoric and the actions of the current Legal SerN ices Commissioner reflect an intention to pursue both
the smaller matters that bother consumers and the larger ethical violations. Scc John Briton, "The System for
Dealing with Complaints: The Commission's Approach", 5 March 2006, 5 6, available at http://www.lsc.qld.gox.
au/spccchcs/BAQ050306.pdft, scc also supra nn. 81 -83 and accompanying text.
BUILDING A BETTER LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEM
high compliance costs for what will often be a minimal return to clients. The Guidelines
advise solicitors not only on how to handle these issues prospectively, but that they should
review their files and refund to clients any undisclosed mark-ups or surcharges or other
charges in excess of the amounts actually paid that were charged after 1 July 2004.97 This
pronouncement effectively requires solicitors to review all of their billing since that date and
attempt to confirm that all amounts including postage and filing fees were properly and
accurately charged to clients. This time-consuming and costly undertaking for solicitors
could be expected to yield relatively small refunds, if any, for clients.
In contrast, the Commission has not yet specifically directed initiatives against malfea-
sance in large firm corporate practice, focusing instead on matters that mainly affect individ-
ual clients. While clients of large corporate firms are generally better able to protect
themselves than individual consumers, a lawyer discipline agency should not overlook the
fact that most lawyers' work is performed for corporate clients. 98 Not all of these businesses
are large or wealthy. Mloreover, there can be little doubt that lawyer misconduct occurs in
large law firms. Large firm lawyers sometimes act, for the benefit of their corporate clients,
in ways that constitute professional misconduct. 99 These lawyers may also act in ways that
harm their corporate clients. For instance, there is every reason to believe that overbilling
occurs in these law firms1" and guidelines with respect to hourly billing would remove much
of the uncertainty that is known to be associated with that type of billing. Hopefully the Legal
Services Commission will soon use its "consumer protection" mandate to pursue initiatives
that reach into larger law firm practice, where lawyer misconduct also occurs.
Are initial inquiries being handled in a consistent fashion? Initial inquiries regarding problems
with a Queensland lawyer are currently received in two places. More than two-thirds of all
inquiries go to the Queensland Law Society and the remainder go to the Legal Services
Commission.0 1 This arrangement is no accident. The Law Society's website states that if
consumers are not sure whether they have cause for complaint, they may contact either the
Queensland Law Society or the LSC. 112
Both the Law Society and the Legal Services Commission will attempt to resolve some
inquiries informally, although their focus appears to differ slightly. The Law Society's web-
site refers individuals to its Client Relations Centre (CRC), which it describes as "an early
intervention service". 10 3 Much of the Law Society's focus appears to be on its "effectiveness
17 "Guidelines for Charging Outlays and Disburscmcnts", available at www.lsc.qld.gov.au/policics/guidc-
lines.pdf.
s For example, thcrc is cvidcncc that almost two-thirds ofall Chicago lawyers' time is dcvotcd to the corporate
sector and that two thirds of Chicago lawyers' income derives from corporate clients: J.P. Heinz, R.L Nelson,
R. Sandcfur and E. Laumann, Urban Lawyers: The NewSocial Sirucure ofihe Bar (Chicago, Univcrsity ofChicago
Press, 2005), 43.
'9 A rcccnt cxamplc can bc sccn in the chargcs that partners in Melbourne's Clay ton Utz law firm engaged in pro-
fessional misconduct including the destruction of documents and possible perjury during their representation of
British Amcrican Tobacco Australia Services in a lawsuit brought against it to rCcovcr damages suffered by a lung
cancer Nictim. See R. Wallace, "Law yers for Big Tobacco Accused" The Ausralian (Sydney), 21 December 2006, 5.
100 Scc Briton, supra n. 51; L.G. Lcrman, "A Doublc Standard for Lawyer Dishoncsty: Billing Fraud Versus
Misappropriation" (2006) 34 Hot;'ta Law Review 847.
L10 Icgal Services Commission, supra n. .51, 15, Tablc 4.1.
102 Queensland Law Society, "What to Do if you are Concerned", www.qls.com.au/wse/lwmp/workplace/
!ut/p/ s.7 0)\15.
103 Ibid. It further explains that "the earlier a problem or potential problem is referred to the CRC, the greater the
likelihood the CRC will bc able to assist the solicitor and the clicnt to reach a mutually satistactory outcome" (ibid).
LESLIE C. LEVIN
in resolving concerns between consumers and practitioners ... without situations escalating
to a point where a formal complaint [is] made to the Legal Services Commissioner". 1 4
During the period October 2004 to January 2005, only 3.1 per cent of all inquiry matters
received by the CRC resulted in a formal complaint being lodged with the Legal Services
Commission. "
In contrast, the Legal Services Commission also attempts to resolve some inquiries infor-
mally before they become complaints, but it seems less concerned than the Law Society with
resolving matters before complaints are filed. So, for example, the Legal Services
Commission website mentions, but does not stress, the availability of its Inquiry Officers to
try to resolve some problems informally. 16 It does not track or report the number of
inquiries it resolves.
This subtle difference in orientation may be causing the Law Society to encourage indi-
viduals to resolve matters with their lawyers when the Legal Services Commission would
encourage the same individuals to file a complaint. One reason for the difference could be
that the Law Society focuses more on individual consumer satisfaction than the Legal
Services Commission, which is more mindful of the need to protect the public at large. A less
charitable explanation is that the Law Society's early intervention approach is also designed
to help solicitors avoid the embarrassment, expense and potential exposure that comes from
a complaint being filed. In either event, there is unquestionably some difference in approach.
A printed brochure available at the Law Society said that matters not suitable for mediation
included situations where the facts appear to warrant prosecution of the solicitor for "pro-
fessional misconduct", 117 while the Legal Services Commission will not try to resolve a mat-
ter where it should be prosecuted for either "professional misconduct or "unsatisfactory
professional conduct". The chances of inconsistency are increased by the fact that virtually
everyone associated with the discipline process admits that the meaning of "unsatisfactory
professional conduct" is not clear and remains to be fleshed out by decisions of the Legal
Practice Committee, the Legal Practice Tribunal and the Court of Appeal.
A further source of inconsistency appears in the practice of the Legal Services
Commission but not the Law Society to consider a lawyer's inquiry history before
attempting to resolve a matter informally. Lawyers who are the source of multiple inquiries
may be engaging in a pattern of low-level neglect, incompetence or misconduct, and this pat-
tern arguably should be considered before attempting to resolve a new matter informally.
While the Legal Services Commission reportedly routinely checks the inquiry database to
determine whether a lawyer has previously been the subject of inquiries before deciding
whether to try to resolve a matter informally, it does not appear that the Law Society's client
relations officers who also have access to the database routinely consider the particular
lawyer's inquiry history before making this determination. Yet failure to consider inquiry
histories may result in the repeated informal resolution of problems involving lawyers who
engage in a continuing pattern of misconduct, as described below.
The apparent lack of consistency in the handling of initial inquiries raises questions about
the wisdom of continuing to receive inquiries in two different places. The problem might be
104 Iid; also Inter iew # 4 with Queensland Law Society employ ee (Brisbane, 11 October 2006).
'l Quccnsland l.aw Socicty, Annual Report 2004 2005,19.
106 See http://www.lsc.qld.go.au/complaint.htm#3.
117 Quccnsland Law Socicty, Brochurc, Client Relations Centre.
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addressed by clearer guidelines from the LSC about which types of cases are appropriate for
informal resolution, and which are not. There is, however, no obvious economic or other
advantage to the public in having the Law Society handle these initial inquiries. The public
funds that pay for complaints-handling by the Law Society could be funnelled to the Legal
Services Commission so that it could field all inquiries. Mioreover, no matter how carefully
and conscientiously it handles these inquiries, the Law Society will always be susceptible to
the charge that it is protecting its own. There is administrative inefficiency in the current
approach, as well. Sometimes individuals make inquiries to both the Law Society and the
Legal Services Commission, hoping that they will get a "better answer" from one entity if
they don't like the one they receive from the other.'08 This is wasteful and inefficient from
everyone's perspective.
Should the Bar Association and the Law Society remain involved in investigations? A question
that is closely related to the preceding discussion is whether the Queensland Bar Association
and the Law Society should continue to be involved in conducting investigations for the
Legal Services Commission. During the initial transition in 2004, it seemed sensible for
the Law Society and the Bar Association to continue to investigate complaints, as they had
the personnel and established systems to do so. Today, it is no longer clear whether they
should continue to perform these functions, both because of the perceived conflict of inter-
est and because of the inefficiency of this approach. There is, in addition, a question mark
over whether the Bar Association, which uses volunteers to perform investigations, will be
able to keep up with the work flow on a voluntary basis. At this point, it is difficult to articu-
late a good reason why investigations should continue to be conducted by the professional
associations. 1 9 A preferable approach would be for the professional associations to relin-
quish these responsibilities to the Legal Services Commission, so that it could conduct all
investigations of lawyers.
Many common law jurisdictions have, at some point, relied upon professional associations
to investigate complaints against lawyers. The practice in the United States began in the
1870s and continued for more than a century."1 By that time, the American Bar
Association's study of lawyer discipline systems had declared the state of lawyer discipline
"scandalous", in part because of the ways in which professional associations handled the
investigation of lawyers. 111 While closer oversight of professional associations' investigative
efforts may have reduced the criticism, it would not eliminate the problem that such a
process is duplicative. Nor would it eliminate the spectre of "Caesar judging Caesar".
The duplicative consequences of sharing the investigative function with professional
organisations can be seen in New South Wales, where the Law Society Council and
Council of the Bar Association remain involved in discipline investigations and retain the
power to dismiss complaints. The Legal Services Commissioner monitors the Councils'
investigations of complaints and reviews their decisions to dismiss complaints or to impose
10 Interview # 4 with Queensland Law Society employee (Brisbane, 11 October 2006).
'9 The one explanation that I heard that had any saliency was that members of thc Bar Association arc better
able to understand the practice of law by other barristers than are in estigators. But since some of the law) ers who
work for the I.SC were barristers, this argument is unpcrsuasivc.
110 See L. Levin, "The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline" (2006) 20 Georgetown Jurnal ofLegalEti,
1, 15-19. The professional associations were criticiscd, inler a/ia, for delays in responding to complaints and for their
reluctance to pursue in estigations of prominent law) ers.
... Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforccmcnt, supra n. 1, 1.
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reprimands. 112 During 2005 6, more than 700 complaints were referred to the Councils for
investigation and resolution, which represented more than 25 per cent of all complaints
received by the Legal Services Commissioner. In addition to the monitoring function that
the Commissioner was required to perform for the typical investigation, there were 76
requests for review of the Councils' decisions to dismiss, and 46 reviews occurred during the
reporting period. 11
3
Costly duplication of effort also occurs in the investigation of complaints in Queensland.
At present, the Law Society's investigators are employed by the Law Society and paid from
Government funds. After the investigator thoroughly investigates a matter and reviews it
with the manager of investigations, the Law Society submits a report to the LSC, ranging
from five to 40 pages. 114 The LSC then carefully reviews the report. If the matter is prose-
cuted, the Commission's Legal Officers who typically supervise the investigations of the
cases they pursue must learn the facts of those cases for the purposes of trying them before
the Committee or the Tribunal. Rather than retain this time-consuming and duplicative
process, the Government funds that now pay for the Law Society's investigative efforts
should be directed toward hiring additional Legal Services Commission investigators who
could perform all discipline investigations.
Is "minor misconduct" being handled e/j2ctivel y and in a manner that protects the public? Minor
lawyer misconduct may now be resolved in a variety of ways in Queensland. First, as previ-
ously noted, an inquiry about lawyer misconduct may be resolved informally by the CRC or
the Legal Services Commission before it ever becomes a complaint. Second, if the matter
cannot be resolved and an individual files a complaint, it may be classified as a "consumer
dispute", which is a complaint that does not rise to the level of "unsatisfactory professional
conduct" or "professional misconduct". 19 The range of conduct that constitutes a "con-
sumer dispute" is not entirely clear, but it appears that it could include failure to attend to
matters promptly or a failure to return phone calls. Third, the complaint may be classified as
"unsatisfactory professional conduct", but a "public interest" dismissal may be granted
where the LSC decides not to pursue a complaint after the lawyer agrees to take steps to
improve his or her office's practices. Fourth, if the complaint cannot be resolved to the LSC's
satisfaction, the matter may proceed to the Legal Practice Committee for a hearing and,
where appropriate, the imposition of a sanction.
The effort to address "minor" misconduct is a significant improvement on the prior dis-
cipline system, which rarely afforded assistance to the public when minor problems arose
involving lawyers. As the preceding paragraph illustrates, however, most "minor" miscon-
duct is resolved privately and never becomes known to the public. In cases where the con-
duct is truly aberrational and the harm to clients minimal, this approach is probably
appropriate. But certain types of "minor" misconduct including repeated neglect of client
matters and failure to communicate with clients is more problematic, and is conduct about
which the public undoubtedly would want to know.
Consistent rules for the prosecution of "minor" misconduct are needed so that patterns of
complaints and evidence of recidivism are being adequately tracked and considered by the
112 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSXX), s 688(f) (g).
' New South Wales Office ofthc I.cgal Serviccs Commissioncr, Annual Reporl 2005 2006, 7-8, 35.
114 Interiew # 4 with Queensland Law Society employee (Brisbane, 11 October 2006).
"15 Lcgal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), s 262.
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Legal Services Commission. There is significant recidivism among lawyers who are disci-
plined in the United States1 16 and there is evidence of recidivism among lawyers who have
received sanctions in Queensland. 117 While the fact that some lawyers receive a number of
complaints does not, standing alone, necessarily mean that any misconduct occurred, it may
reflect a pattern of misconduct that should be carefully considered in order to adequately
protect the public.
Thus, careful attention must be paid not only to the informal dispositions of "inquiries",
as discussed in the preceding section, but also to the categorisation of "consumer disputes"
and the use of "public interest" dismissals for complaints that allege unsatisfactory profes-
sional misconduct.'1 18 In cases where "minor" misconduct appears to have occurred in more
than one instance, the LSC should consider carefully whether to approve a "public interest"
dismissal or whether to seek a disposition that enables the public to learn of the misconduct,
at least for some period of time. 119 In addition, if a lawyer who receives a "public interest"
dismissal is later the subject of another conduct complaint, the Legal Practice Committee or
the Legal Practice Tribunal should be able to consider that information when imposing a
sanction in the subsequent matter. If necessary, in order to ensure that the information can
be revealed in a subsequent discipline proceeding, any practitioner who obtains a "public
interest" dismissal should be required to stipulate that in the event that a future discipline
complaint results in a prosecution, the Legal Services Commission can bring this informa-
tion to the attention of the relevant tribunal. Finally, any recidivism that occurs after public
interest dismissals are granted should be carefully tracked so that the Legal Services
Commission can evaluate the effectiveness of its approach.
Are the disciplina y bodies constituted in the most efrective fish ion? Queensland's use of a two-
tier system for hearing discipline matters and its decision to have a Supreme Court justice sit
as the upper Legal Practice Tribunal is unique. Linda Haller has previously critiqued this
two-tier structure, noting its potential for confusion with respect to whether discipline mat-
ters should be heard in the Legal Practice Committee or the Legal Practice Tribunal. 12 Now
that the new system has been implemented, it is clear that she was correct. In addition, the
use of two separate bodies is an ineffective use of resources and poses some risk that it will
result in inconsistent and confusing case law. The present system also discourages meaning-
ful input from the lay participants and some lawyers in the process. The better approach
would be to eliminate the Legal Practice Tribunal, to allow a single body to decide all
conduct matters, and to give the LSC the power to impose public reprimands in certain
prescribed cases.
116 Icvin, supra n. 110, 1.
117 See Haller, swp;a n. 18, 23; Briton, supra n. 55, 4. One former member of the Solicitors Complaints Tribunal
noted that "a lot ofrcpcat offenders" who had previously been disciplined came bcforc that body: Interview # 8 with
lax member of Solicitors Complaints Tribunal (Brisbane, 16 October 2006).
iS The I.SC has indicated that in the future, he will be using the "public interest" dismissals more and the "con-
sumer dispute" category less. Both categories lead to a non public disposition of a complaint. The advantage of
using the "public interest" dismissal is that the i.SC can more effectively negotiate with the practitioner to put Sys-
tems in place that will avoid complaints in the future.
119 See in/ia nn. 141-42 and accompanying text. Prior complaints reportedly arc considered in the I.SC's dcci-
sion making with regard to public interest dismissals: Interview # 9 with Legal Services Commission regulator
(Brisbane, 17 October 2006). But it is unclear whether there arc any clearly dcfincd standards with respect to how
prior complaints are to be weighed in the process.
120 Ilallcr, supra n. 39,421-26.
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The reasons why a two-tier discipline system was adopted in Queensland are not clear, but
it appears that the decision may have been made for both practical and symbolic reasons.
From a practical perspective, if a Supreme Court justice is going to hear some discipline cases
as a matter of first impression, the justice should not have to hear every minor misconduct
complaint. This makes sense from the perspective of preservation of judicial resources, but
it begs the question of whether a Supreme Court justice should be hearing lawyer discipline
cases in the first instance.
Why the Supreme Court justices agreed to constitute the Legal Practice Tribunal can only
be imagined, 121 but the decision was probably motivated by political realities and by the
desire to convey important messages to various constituencies. From a political perspective,
the Court may have felt the need to offer the Government a compromise after it rejected
Government efforts to make the judiciary responsible for supervising a new lawyer discipline
agency. 122 The Court's participation in the Legal Practice Tribunal may also reflect its desire
to send messages to three different audiences. First, the involvement of a Supreme Court jus-
tice in the Legal Practice Tribunal conveys to the public the importance that the judiciary
attaches to the lawyer discipline process and to the public's complaints against lawyers.
Second, it conveys to lawyers the seriousness of discipline proceedings and the judiciary's
concern about lawyer misconduct. And third, during a time when the legislature was becom-
ing deeply involved in the regulation of lawyers, it conveys to the legislature that the judi-
ciary intends to retain some direct and regular control over the discipline of lawyers. 123
One question to consider, however, is whether the symbolism is worth the price, not only
in terms of judicial resources and administrative costs,124 but in other respects. Because the
Legal Practice Tribunal is a Supreme Court justice, the LSC may feel reluctant to bring
"professional misconduct" charges before the Tribunal where the act fits within the statu-
tory definition but the harm is relatively minor. 12' The LSC may fear that the Tribunal will
feel that the LSC is "wasting" the justice's time. If the Commission is reluctant to prosecute
as "professional misconduct" certain behaviour that falls within that statutory definition, this
may skew the Commission's decisions as to how it should define "professional misconduct",
at a time when it is also struggling to define "unsatisfactory professional conduct" and "con-
sumer disputes". This may, in turn, contribute to the development of case law that is at odds
with the statutory definition of the terms.
The structure of the Legal Practice Tribunal also discourages lay input, and possibly input
from practitioners as well. The advisory panels to the Legal Practice Tribunal are relatively
121 The precise in oh ement of the Supreme Court in the shaping of the Act is unclear, but there is no question
that the judiciary's view was solicitcd, and that the Govcrnmcnt took into account the role the judiciary wished to
play in the lawyer discipline process when it drafted the legislation.
122 Sccs pra n. 28.
12' See eg Chief Justice P. deJersey, "The Supreme Court and the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld)" (2004) 23
UIniersitf, l'fQueenslandLaw Journal 289, 290 (noting the judiciary's concern that "any rcform uphold thc Supreme
Court as the source of a legal practitioner's professional legitimacy").
During the pcriod whcn thc proposed legislation was under discussion, thc judiciary struggled to dcfinc its own
role with respect to the regulation of law) ers. While insisting on its right to retain admission powers ox er lawy ers,
it almost simultancously ccdcd authority to ovcrscc the discipline proccss. Comparc F. NLctcalf, "Judgcs Call for
Ultimate Sax on Who Can Practise", Courier Mail (Brisbane), 26 March 1999, 11 with Monk and Ryan, supra n. 28.
124 Thc Icgal Practice Tribunal and the Lcgal Practice Committcc arc administered by different cntitics and
require the appointment and co ordination of separate panels.
125 Scc Intcrvicw # 16 with Lcgal Scrviccs Commission regulator (Brisbanc, 26 October 2006).
BUILDING A BETTER LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEM
large composed of six solicitors, six barristers and seven lay persons126  which means that
any individual panel member typically hears no more than one case a year. This makes it
difficult for lay panel members, in particular, to achieve an understanding of the issues or to
attain a comfort level with the decision-making process. Moreover, under the Act, the
Supreme Court justice is the ultimate decision-maker, and the lay panel member and the
practitioner panel member play a decidedly secondary role. 127 Members of those panels indi-
cated that it is difficult to feel free to present their views or to disagree with a Supreme Court
justice, particularly when any individual panel member only rarely participates in the disci-
pline process. One lay participant felt that lay people were simply participants in the process
for "perception" or symbolic purposes. 128 Even some lawyer-participants felt inhibited when
participating in the process. As one solicitor panel member observed, "it is awe inspiring for
solicitors who don't normally sit on that side of the bench it is not a familiar situation". 129
Something important is lost if lawyers on the panel are inhibited from providing mean-
ingful input into decision-making about lawyer conduct. The vast majority of discipline is
imposed against solicitors, but Supreme Court justices almost invariably practised as barris-
ters. As one lawyer asked, "[h]ow does he know what is the norm in the life of solicitors?"''13
And even the justices' experiences as barristers often occurred decades in the past. Thus, the
decision-making process could benefit from the uninhibited input of practitioners, who
could provide an understanding of the context in which problems arise.
Lay people also have an important perspective to offer the Tribunal that is being lost in
the current process. Lay people have a sense of the real world and of proportionality. Since
they are not as concerned with maintaining the reputation of the legal profession as are
lawyers and judges, they can more freely apply their sense of proportionality to the facts of a
case. While the lay people whom I interviewed uniformly felt that they could not speak freely
when assisting the Tribunal, their comments provide insights into their potential contribu-
tions to the process. For instance, one lay person described trying (unsuccessfully) to con-
vince the Tribunal and the solicitor panel member in a high publicity case that a lawyer did
not deserve to be struck off.1 31 Echoing a view I heard often, one lawyer noted, "I think that
the profession is harder on lawyers who did wrong than are consumers because it is in our
interest to get rid of the sharks". 132
Lay people bring not only a sense of proportionality to the discipline process, but also their
ordinary notions of morality. Virtually all of the lay people I interviewed recalled their initial
surprise about the lack of connection in lawyer discipline cases between "the law" and
notions of justice. As one lay person noted, "lots of lawyers don't think there is a difference
between 'law' and 'justice'". 133 Another observed, "a lot of what happened didn't have to do
126 http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au//lpc.htm.
127 That role is to "help" the Lcgal Practice Tribunal in hearing and deciding the discipline matter: Legal
Profession Act 2004 (Qld), s 437(3). The reason for this structure is unclear. It ma) be because the judiciary jeal
ously guards the independence of thc court, including in the imposition of discipline (scc supra n. 123). It also may
haxe been thought unseemly for a Supreme Court justice, a lawyer and a la) person to haxe equal standing on a tri
bunal.
121 Interiew # 14 with Legal Practice Tribunal la) panel member (Brisbane, 25 October 2006).
129 Interview # 11 with Legal Practice Tribunal solicitor panel member (telephone interview, 19 October 2006).
130 Jbid.
131 Interview # 6 with Legal Practice Tribunal lay panel member (Brisbane, 12 October 2006).
132 Interview # 12 with Legal Practice Committee member (Brisbane, 23 October 2006).
""' Interview # 6 with Legal Practice Tribunal lay panel member (Brisbane, 12 October 2006).
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with justice or ethics it had to do with the legal rule". 134 This same individual recalled a
lawyer member of a panel who did not want to discipline a solicitor "because the conduct
didn't fit within a pigeonhole and my attitude was 'bugger that"'.139 This lay perspective
is an important one to be preserved in the process.
For these reasons, the Legal Practice Tribunal should be eliminated and a single decision-
making body composed of lay people and practitioners should hear all complaints alleging
unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct. Serious consideration should
still be given, however, to the question of how to ensure that lay people are adequately heard. 136
One way of accomplishing this end might be to use three-person panels composed of at least one
lay person and one practitioner, while the third person would alternately be a practitioner or a
lay person. This might help to change the culture so that everyone involved understands that
the views of lay people are as important as those of practitioners. Appeals from decisions of this
body could then be taken to a three-judge panel of the Queensland Court of Appeal. 137
One final, separate problem with the current adjudicatory structure is that enormous
resources may be devoted to handling very minor matters. As one lawyer asked, "[w]hy have
all this cost over matters involving postage fees?"' 138 For example, if a lawyer who uses offen-
sive language when addressing a member of the public is charged with "unsatisfactory pro-
fessional conduct", the complaint would be heard by the Legal Practice Committee. This will
require the expenditure of time and effort by the Legal Services Commission's lawyer, the
respondent, the respondent's lawyer, and three panel members. The LSC inevitably must
consider when making his charging decision whether he wishes to expend resources in this
way and the Legal Practice Committee's likely response to its decision to do so. And the
Committee whose practitioner members serve on a voluntary basis is left to feel that the
LSC's charge (which can result in huge defence fees for the respondent lawyer) is dispro-
portionate and that its own time is being wasted on exceedingly "minor" matters. This atti-
tude may result in no imposition of discipline by the Legal Practice Committee so that it can
express its displeasure to the Legal Services Commission for bringing the matter. 139 This
' Intcrvicw# 8 with lay mcmbcr of Solicitors Complaints Tribunal (Brisbane, 16 Octobcr 2006).
13, Ibid.
136 Thc feelings ofmarginalisation rcportcd by lay pcoplc did not just arise on the Lcgal Practicc Tribunal. Onc
person reported the experience of having her views discounted b) lawyers when sitting on the three member
Solicitors Complaints Tribunal, which suggcsts that this may also bc a problem for lay mcmbcrs of thc similarly-
constituted Legal Practice Committee. See supra n. 67 and accompany ing text.
17 Thus far, there has bccn only one appcal to the Court of Appcal from a decision of thc Legal Practice Tribunal
or the Legal Practice Committee: Legal Serv ices Commission, supra n. 51, 24; Baker v Legal Serzies Comnissioner
[2006] QCA 145. It is likely that thcrc has bccn only onc appeal from the Tribunal's dccisions-cvcn though thc
stakes are high because the matter has already been decided b) a Supreme Court justice. It can be expected that if
a pancl of lay pcoplc and practitioners rcplacc thc Legal Practice Tribunal, thcrc would bc more appeals in scrious
matters, but it seems unlikely that the total judicial time devoted to discipline matters would be greater than it is
under thc current systcm.
131 Inter iew # 12 with Legal Practice Committee member (Brisbane, 23 October 2006). In fact, there has not
yet bccn a reported discipline dccision involving postagc fccs, but this comment may havc bccn a rcfcrcnce to thc
LSC's Guidelines for Charging Outlay s and Disbursements, with its suggestion of possible discipline for non com
pliancc. Scc supra n. 97 and accompanying text. The lawyer's point, howCvcr, was that occasionally very minor mat-
ters had been pursued before the hearing bodies, requiring a disproportionate expenditure of money and human
rcsourccs.
13' In the case on which the fact scenario is based, the solicitor called her client's ex husband "a grotesquely ugh,
man". As soon as thc solicitor was contactcd about thc mattcr, shc offcrcd a writtcn apology, which was rcfuscd. Thc
matter ultimately resulted in a finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct for the use of offensixe language, but
thc solicitor was not fincd or ordcrcd to pay costs: Legal Services Commissioner vJohnson [2005] I.PC006/05.
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type of decision may, in turn, chasten the LSC, who may think twice about prosecuting this
type of matter in the future. 140 In turn, the failure to prosecute may eventually send the
signal that the LSC will not seek to pursue lawyers for rude or offensive language.
A better approach would be to give the LSC the power to impose minor sanctions such
as a reprimand or a compensation order on consent. Minor sanctions imposed by the LSC
on consent should appear on the LSC website, 141 should only be available on one occasion
against any particular lawyer, 142 and should only be imposed for truly minor misconduct.
This would enable the charged lawyer to avoid some of the expense associated with extended
discipline proceedings, resolve a stressful matter more quickly, and confine the use of the
three-person hearing body to situations where more egregious or contested conduct was
at issue. It would also reduce the costs of prosecution for an already costly lawyer discipline
system.
V. Conclusion
There is much to be admired in Queensland's lawyer discipline reforms. For the first time,
barristers are subject to a discipline process that can result in an array of sanctions.
Complaints against practitioners are being investigated much more quickly and prosecution
decisions are being made by an independent agency headed by a non-lawyer. The public are
able to learn about the discipline imposed on lawyers, which enables individuals to better
protect themselves when they choose to retain counsel. The new discipline system offers
much more transparency and credibility than the previous one. It is among the most con-
sumer-oriented discipline systems in the world.
As anyone close to Queensland's lawyer discipline system will admit, however, it is still a
work in progress. With the benefit of some experience, it is now possible to identify some
changes that would improve the system's responsiveness, its credibility and its efficacy. For
example, during the initial transition in 2004, it made sense for the professional associations
to continue to receive inquiries about lawyers, to try to resolve them, where appropriate, and
to investigate some complaints. For the reasons previously discussed, it is far from clear
whether it is desirable for the professional associations to continue in those roles today. After
the experience with a two-tribunal system, consideration should also be given to combining
the Legal Practice Tribunal and the Legal Practice Committee into a single adjudicative body.
In addition, efforts should be made to increase meaningful lay participation in that body. The
Legal Services Commission should be more willing to provide redress for clients who are vic-
timised by negligent legal work, rather than forcing those individuals to go to court.
As complaints handling and other procedures are tested and refined, it is important to keep
asking how well Queensland's Legal Services Commission is achieving its dual mandate of
140 See Inter iew # 1 with Legal Ser ices Commission regulator (Brisbane, 3 October 2006).
..' This practice is also currently followed in New South Wales: Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), ss 540(2),
576(e).
142 In the United States, disciplinary counsel typically have the power to impose admonitions on consent, but in
many jurisdictions those sanctions are priv ate, and too often they are imposed repeatedly before more serious pub
lic discipline is imposed. Scc Icvin, supra n. 110. A better practice would bc to allow the I.SC to sanction a lawyer
for minor misconduct on one occasion only, with the understanding that if there is no further finding of misconduct
during a specified period, the information will be removed from the Commission's wcbsitc.
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consumer protection and traditional lawyer discipline. Consumer surveys are one way to test
what is not being done well, but they are less likely to capture the success of the reforms. 
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Another way of helping to ensure that individual consumer concerns are addressed is to give
the LSC the power to impose minor sanctions and make small compensation awards. At the
same time, in order to ensure protection of the general public, the Legal Services
Commission should carefully track those lawyers who are the subject of multiple inquiries
and complaints to ensure that lawyers engaging in persistent low-level misconduct are not
consistently "flying under the radar". Recidivism among those who receive sanctions should
also be carefully tracked. Published guidelines covering a variety of areas including hourly
billing practices may be a faster means of altering lawyer conduct than case-by-case
enforcement efforts.
Finally, as Queensland embraces an independent regulatory model in the area of lawyer
discipline, the question naturally arises as to what role, if any, lawyers' professional associa-
tions should continue to play in related spheres of regulation. Specifically, the inherent con-
flict presented by the Law Society's position as a lawyers' guild and a regulator raises
questions about the wisdom of its continued involvement in the monitoring of client trust
accounts. Similar questions are raised by the Law Society's and Bar Association's role in issu-
ing annual practising certificates. These questions merit careful consideration, with due
regard for available resources and the organisational challenges for any lawyer regulatory
agency that might attempt to assume so many different responsibilities. Among the issues
that should also be considered are possible information asymmetries if the professional asso-
ciations are unwilling to share all available information, duplication of investigative efforts,
the current effectiveness of trust account oversight, and the willingness of the professional
associations to make "hard" decisions about practising certificates.
Inevitably, as progress in any system is made, new questions arise concerning its focus and
efficacy. Fortunately, Queensland now has a reasonably well-funded and well-staffed disci-
pline system. Moreover, the many individuals who have come together to make the system
work are dedicated people, who are making good judgments and who share a common inter-
est in protecting the public. If the progress and choices made to date are any indication, the
signs are hopeful that these questions will be addressed soon and that Queensland's lawyer
discipline system will come to be viewed as a model for best practices in Australia and
throughout the world.
143 Most respondents will not have cause to complain about more than one la yer, so they w ill not be able to com-
ment on the changes that hav e occurred ov er the last few years. Mioreov er, satisfied consumers often feel no need to
comment; it is often those who arc most unhappy with a system that arc most likely to respond to consumer surveys.
